Monday, November 07, 2005

Translation of article linked from “Zek est de nouveau parmi nous”

From ¡No Pasaràn!: Zek est de nouveau parmi nous we linked the following from the blog “Zek II: L'exil intérieur” (Zek II: Internal exile):

Pourquoi Chirac a peur/ Why Chirac is afraid

The latest offensives ammounted to some kind of "emergency plan for the suburbs", aiming to re-enstate the authority of the republic in the occupied territories.
The islamists then consolidated their victories, and benefitted from it to gradually conquer more land.
The message was clear: any incursion of the French State into the territory was punished by riots, fires, and retibution on French nationals. That applied not only to the police force, but also to firemen, doctors, etc. The riot stopped when the government dhimmis accepted, not only to leave islamists a free hand, but to finance them with billions for an "emergency plan for the suburbs".

But, like criminals always leaving their mark, the riots revealed their true objective through their targets: social schools, cribs, centers, community gyms, etc...
In other words they were mainly buildings representing the French Republic, those which symbolized the "policy of integration" the most were most prominently attacked.
These riots didn’t take place because "France refuses to integrate its Moslems", and other banal reasons, but exactly for the opposite reason: because France tries to integrate its Moslems.

What’s written plainly in the rappers’lyrics that the government dhimmis subsidize and find artful, but refuse to read is no different than in the past when they refused to read Mein Kampf.
Urban gangs were used as the avant-garde of the Islamic army by sowing terror in previously calm districts. That made it possible to test the resistance of the local institutions. If one appeared weak then a new territory was ripe to join dar-Al-Islam.
The problem with this strategy, it is that the Moslems themselves were resistant to that Taliban. Some were obstinant enough to send their children to the public school and were themselves “republican”, calling on the doctor rather than with the marabout, and to call the fire department and the police force when cars burned around them. These behaviors eroded the seizure of Talibans on the "suburbs".
It was thus necessary to radicalize the Moslem population, to instill in it the hatred of the dhimmi, so as to swallow Jihad up in whole.

What then to do?

A solution consists in pushing the dhimmis to the point where they will have to choose between the removal of a few troublemakers or complete and final absorption.
Against that vast, coordinated offensive the islamists troops burn and sometimes kill all that they can, until the long awaited collapse takes place. In this case, one can count on a rapid collapse of France under the double shock of the "anger of the insulted Arab street" and new May 1968 revolt of the left "fed up with by police violence".

Failure and chechmate.

Under that assumption:
Either there will not be time for an "emergency plan for the suburbs";
(That is to say this "emergency plan" will not have any alleviating effect on the rabble.)
In any event, there are already indications that this is the only way this will play out: confronted with extreme violence, the police force will be extremely careful in its response, operate within the law, and bear the shootings. The orders are clear: an arab must be avoided at all costs. Let us let Mrs. Michu remain respectable rather than get hit by one of her stonethrowers.

What terrorizes the government, is that the police force will sooner or later cave in, either while refusing to confront violence (to unjustly put their fate in a negligible minority in the legal syndicate), or by being defeat by the riff-raff themselves. The alternative, sending in the army, will not change anything if they’re forced to operate under the same restrictions as the police force.
If the precipitous shooting of a few rioters precipitates either of the outcomes described above, the government’s only choices will be to become either more authoritative or to succumb to the revolution
End of item.

No comments: